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Abstract
In previous work, we developed the scaled SIS process, which models the dynamics of SIS epi-
demics over networks. With the scaled SIS process, we can consider networks that are finite-sized
and of arbitrary topology (i.e., we are not restricted to specific classes of networks). We derived for
the scaled SIS process a closed-form expression for the time-asymptotic probability distribution of
the states of all the agents in the network. This closed-form solution of the equilibrium distribu-
tion explicitly exhibits the underlying network topology through its adjacency matrix. This paper
determines which network configuration is the most probable. We prove that, for a range of epi-
demics parameters, this combinatorial problem leads to a submodular optimization problem, which
is exactly solvable in polynomial time. We relate the most-probable configuration to the network
structure, in particular, to the existence of high density subgraphs. Depending on the epidemics
parameters, subset of agents may be more likely to be infected than others; these more-vulnerable
agents form subgraphs that are denser than the overall network. We illustrate our results with
a 193 node social network and the 4941 node Western US power grid under different epidemics
parameters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A network is a graph; it is a collection of nodes connected by edges. Networks have
been used in science and engineering to represent systems of multiple interconnected, in-
terdependent components. As a result, the network structure has a large impact on the
behavior of the system. Quantifying how network structure impacts network function, that
is, the behavior of dynamical processes on networks, is a difficult problem since the system
components do not behave independently.
In this paper, we focus on analyzing the behavior of network diffusion processes such as
epidemics. Analytical results for epidemics on networks have been obtained under particular
conditions: full mixing models (i.e., the underlying network is a complete graph); infinite-
sized networks models using mean-field approximation; or for scaled-free networks [1–4].
These approaches approximate the underlying network topology with mathematically sim-
pler structures, because accounting for the exact graph topology is a combinatorial problem
that is difficult to analyze and computationally expensive to compute. We showed in previ-
ous work [5, 6] that ,for a specific network diffusion process, which we called the scaled SIS
(Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) process, it is possible to characterize its time-asymptotic
behavior on any arbitrary, finite-sized network with N agents.
The scaled SIS process is Markov. It accounts for 1) exogenous (i.e., spontaneous) infec-
tion at rate λ; 2) endogenous (i.e., neighbor-to-neighbor) infection at rate γ; and 3) healing
at rate µ. The time-asymptotic behavior of the process is described by its equilibrium
distribution, which is a PMF (probability mass function) over all 2N possible network con-
figurations. Our approach preserves the full microscopic states of all the agents in contrast
to previous approaches that only provide results for aggregate or macroscopic states (e.g.,
fraction of infected agents) [7]. However, retaining the exact network configuration means
that the computational complexity of solving for the equilibrium distribution, an eigenvector
problem, scales exponentially with the size of the network, N .
We have shown that, under specific assumptions on the form of the endogenous infection,
the scaled SIS process is a reversible Markov process for which we can find its equilibrium
distribution in closed form, avoiding solving a large eigenvalue/eigenvector problem. Fur-
ther, the equilibrium distribution that we derived exhibits explicitly the underlying network
structure through the network adjacency matrix. The equilibrium distribution is parame-
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terized by two parameters:
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
, where as usual, parameter λ
µ
controls the exogenous, or
the topology-independent behavior of the scaled SIS process, whereas parameter γ controls
the endogenous or the topology-dependent behavior of the process.
We used the equilibrium distribution to address the question of which of the 2N possible
configurations in a network is the most likely to occur in the long run. We refer to this
as the most-probable configuration, which is found by maximizing the equilibrium distri-
bution. This optimization (called the Most-Probable Configuration Problem) is difficult
because: 1) it is combinatorial; 2) it depends on the healing/infection parameters of the
scaled SIS process; and 3) it depends on the underlying network topology. Previously in
[5], we partitioned the space of
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
values into four regimes and were able to find the
most-probable configuration in Regime II) Endogenous Infection Dominant, for which
0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1, for only specific types of networks: k-regular, complete multipartite, and
complete multipartite with k-regular islands. We showed for these specific networks that the
most-probable configuration solution space exhibits phase transition behavior depending on
the network structure and epidemics parameters.
This paper considers the Most-Probable Configuration Problem for arbitrary networks.
We are able to prove that this leads to the optimization of a submodular function for which
we have a polynomial time solution. Further, we show which clusters of agents in the network
are more vulnerable to epidemics than others. These are relevant questions in applications.
For example, these are the clusters to focus on in marketing campaigns or when combating
epidemics.
We review the scaled SIS process in Section II and set up the Most-Probable Configuration
Problem in Section III. In Section IV, we show that, in Regime II), the Most-Probable
Configuration Problem can be transformed into an equivalent submodular problem, and that
it is possible to solve for its exact solution in polynomial time. We apply this to solve the
most-probable configuration for two example networks: the 193 node acquaintance network
of drug users in Hartford, CT [8], and the 4941 node network of the Western US power grid
[9]. Section V shows how the solution space of the Most-Probable Configuration Problem
in Regime II) relates to the density of subgraphs in the network. Section VI concludes the
paper.
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II. SCALED SIS PROCESS
Consider a population of N agents whose interconnections are represented by a static,
simple, unweighted, undirected, connected graph, G(V,E), where V (G) is the set of vertices
and E(G) is the set of edges. For background on graphs see [10]. The topology of G
is captured by the symmetric N × N adjacency matrix, A. The state of the ith agent is
denoted by xi. Agents can be in one of two states: susceptible (xi = 0) or infected (xi = 1);
susceptible agents are vulnerable to infections since there is no immunization in the system.
Let
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
T .
We will refer to xi as the agent state and x as either the network state or the network
configuration. The configuration state space is X = {x}, with cardinality |X | = 2N .
The scaled SIS process models the evolution of the network state, x, over time according
to the stochastic microscopic interaction rules from the SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible)
epidemics. The SIS framework assumes that infected agents can heal and become reinfected
so it does not account for immunization [1]. Let X(t) = x be the state of the network at
time t, t ≥ 0. Under appropriate assumptions, X(t) is a continuous-time Markov process
[7, 11, 12]. The scaled SIS process accounts for 1) exogenous infection (i.e., susceptibles
spontaneously develop infection); 2) endogenous infection (i.e., susceptibles become infected
due to infection from infective neighbors); and 3) healing events. These processes are inde-
pendent. At time t, only one one agent is affected. By including both exogenous infection
and healing, the scaled SIS process does not have an absorbing state at equilibrium.
The scaled SIS process is Markov; each network state is a state of the Markov process.
We define two operators on the network state, x = [x1, x2, . . . xi, . . . xj , . . . , xN ]
T . We use
the following notation:
Hix = [x1, x2, . . . , xi = 1, . . . , xN ]
T
Hj•x = [x1, x2, . . . , xj = 0, . . . , xN ]
T .
The operator Hi defines the operation that agent i becomes infected. If agent i is already
infected, the operator does nothing. The operator Hj• defines the operation that agent j is
healed. If agent j is already uninfected, the operator does nothing.
The time the process spends in a particular state is random and exponentially distributed,
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with the following transition rates corresponding to infection and healing events, respec-
tively:
1. X(t) jumps to the network state where the ith agent, which was healthy, becomes
infected with transition rate
q(x, Hix) = λγ
di , x 6= Hix, (1)
where di =
∑N
j=1 1(xj = 1)Aij, is the number of infected neighbors of node i. The
symbol 1(·) is the indicator function, and A = [Aij ] is the adjacency matrix of the
arbitrary network G that captures the interactions among the agents. There are two
components to the infection rate. If the ith agent has no infected neighbors, di = 0,
and the transition rate reduces to λ > 0. We interpret λ as the exogenous infection
rate, the rate a susceptible agent spontaneously becomes infected; it is the same for
all the agents in the network. If the ith agent has di infected neighbors, the infective
rate is λγdi ; it is the product of λ and the endogenous infection rate, γ > 0, scaled by
di, the number of infected neighbors of agent i. Because of this factor, the infective
rate depends on the network topology.
2. X(t) jumps to the network state where the jth agent, which was infected, heals with
transition rate:
q(x, Hj•x) = µ, x 6= Hj•x. (2)
The healing rate, µ > 0, is the same for all the agents in the system.
A. Equilibrium Distribution
The evolution of the scaled SIS process is captured by the rate (infinitesimal) matrix Q
of the Markov process X(t). The assumption that the underlying network G is connected
assures that the Markov process is irreducible. Therefore, the equilibrium distribution,
pi(x), exists and is given by the left eigenvector corresponding to the 0 eigenvalue of Q, the
rate matrix [13]. The problem in determining the equilibrium distribution pi(x) is that its
computation is prohibitively expensive for meaningful sized networks since Q is a 2N × 2N
matrix. This has limited the analysis of epidemics and spreading processes on networks to
either: 1) full mixing models (e.g., where every agent comes in contact with every other
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agents —the network is a complete graph); 2) to small scale simulations, where N is small
so that O((2N)3) operations are feasible; or 3) to mean field type approximations of special
network configurations.
We proved in [6], see also [5], that the scaled SIS process is a reversible Markov process
by showing that its equilibrium distribution satisfies not only the global balance equation
but also the detailed balance equation [14]. For reversible Markov processes, the equilibrium
distribution is unique. We derived the equilibrium distribution of the scaled SIS process to
be:
pi(x) =
1
Z
(
λ
µ
)1Tx
γ
x
T Ax
2 , x,∈ X (3)
where Z is the partition function,
Z =
∑
x∈X
(
λ
µ
)1Tx
γ
x
T Ax
2 . (4)
Previous epidemics model call the ratio λ
µ
, the effective infection rate [15]. The equilib-
rium distribution, pi(x), factors as the product of three terms: 1) the normalization by the
partition function; 2) the term
(
λ
µ
)1Tx
that is topology independent since the exogenous
infection rate λ and the healing rate µ are identical for all the agents in the network, and
the total number of infected agents, 1Tx, does not depend on the topology; and 3) the
γ
x
T Ax
2 that explicitly accounts for the exact network through its adjacency matrix A. It is
topology dependent since the endogenous infection rate γ is scaled by the number of infected
neighbors; the number of edges where both end nodes are infected (we call them infected
edges), x
TAx
2
, explicitly depends on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network.
B. Parameter Regimes
The scaled SIS Process can model different types of network diffusion processes depending
on the values of the rate parameters; in particular, if the effective exogenous infection rate,
λ
µ
, and the endogenous infection rate, γ, are between 0 and 1, or if they are greater than 1.
In [5], we identified 4 regimes.
When both parameters are either between 0 and 1 or greater than 1, then the most-
probable configuration is either the x0 = [0, 0 . . . , 0]T configuration or the xN = [1, 1 . . . , 1]T
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configuration. Reference [5] also investigated Regime III) where λ
µ
> 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1. This
regime models the counter-intuitive behavior where an increasing number of infected agents
delays additional infection in the network. In this paper, we focus our analysis on Regime II)
Endogenous Infection Dominant: 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1. Regime II best models epidemics
and similar types of spreading processes.
The effective exogenous infection rate, λ
µ
, indicates the preference of individual agents.
With 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, the healing rate is larger than the exogenous infection rate; agents prefer
the healthy state to the infected state. With γ > 1, however, additional infected neighbors
increase the rate at which the healthy agent becomes infected; thereby the network helps to
spread the infection. As a result, the network topology is crucial to determine the behavior
of the scaled SIS process at equilibrium.
In the next section, we introduce the Most-Probable Configuration Problem, which solves
for the network configurations with maximum equilibrium probability. Because there is
competition between the topology independent term and the topology dependent term, the
most-probable configuration exhibits complex phase transition behavior depending on the
effective exogenous infection rate λ
µ
, the endogenous infection rate γ, and the underlying
network topology.
III. MOST-PROBABLE CONFIGURATION PROBLEM
In the previous section, we showed that, for the scaled SIS process, we are able to derive its
equilibrium distribution, pi(x), analytically, see equation (3). The equilibrium distribution
describes the long-run behavior of the network epidemics. While the partition function (4)
renders the exact calculation of the equilibrium distribution infeasible for meaningful size
networks, knowing the equilibrium distribution expression allows us to quickly compare
between network configurations, addressing, for example questions like which of the two is
more probable. Of all the possible 2N network configurations, one is of particular interest,
namely, the configuration of infected and healthy agents that has a higher chance of occurring
in the long run. This is the configuration x∗ that maximizes pi(x). Formally, x∗ maximizes
the equilibrium probability:
x∗ = argmax
x∈X
pi(x) = argmax
x∈X
(
λ
µ
)1Tx
γ
x
T Ax
2 . (5)
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We call this the Most-Probable Configuration Problem and x∗ the most-probable configu-
ration. The Most-Probable Configuration Problem is a combinatorial optimization problem
as agents can only be in one of two states; its solution is dependent on the effective exoge-
nous infection rate, λ
µ
, the endogenous infection rate γ, and the underlying network topology,
captured by the adjacency matrix, A.
Previously in [5], we provided analytical results for the Most-Probable Configuration
Problem in Regime II) Endogenous Infection Dominant: 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1 for particular
networks, namely, structured network topologies such as k-regular, complete multipartite,
complete multipartite with k-regular islands. We observed a phase transition behavior.
Below a threshold condition that depends on the parameters
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
and on the network
topology, the most-probable configuration is x0 = [0, 0, . . . , 0], the configuration where all
agents are susceptibles. Above the threshold condition, the most-probable configuration is
xN = [1, 1, . . . , 1], the configuration where all agents are infected.
This paper extends the analysis of the Most-Probable Configuration Problem in Regime
II) to arbitrary network topologies. We will show that, for arbitrary networks, the most-
probable configuration may be configurations other than x0 and xN . We call these solutions
to the Most-Probable Configuration Problem non-degenerate configurations. These solutions
are useful for identifying agents and communities that are more vulnerable to the epidemics.
We will relate these communities to the structure of the networks in detail later. Figure 1
and Figure 2 show the most-probable configurations obtained by the method of Section IV
for two example networks: a 193-node acquaintance network [8] and the 4941-node power
grid [9]. These are non-degenerate configurations where only a subset of agents are infected.
In Section IV, we prove that we can solve exactly for the most-probable configuration
in Regime II) in polynomial time using submodular optimization. Then, in Section V, we
discuss the relationship between the most-probable configuration and the network topology,
in particular, the relation between non-degenerate configurations and network topology.
IV. SUBMODULARITY AND THE MOST-PROBABLE CONFIGURATION
In this section, we solve the Most-Probable Configuration Problem in Regime II in poly-
nomial time by showing that the problem can be transformed into a submodular function.
First, we review the definition of submodular functions.
8
A. Submodular Function
The Most-Probable Configuration Problem is the maximization of a pseudo-Boolean func-
tion. Pseudo-Boolean functions are functions that map N binary variables to a real number
[16]. Minimization of general pseudo-Boolean functions is NP-hard [17]. Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz,
and Schrijver, [18], proved that the minimization of a pseudo-Boolean function that is sub-
modular can be done in polynomial time. If the function is supermodular, its maximization
is in polynomial time.
A pseudo-Boolean function, f : {0, 1}N → R, is also a set function g : P(V ) → R
where P(V ) is the power set of V = {1, 2, . . . , N}. There are many equivalent definitions of
submodularity [19]. The one we use in this paper is the following:
Definition IV.1 ([16]). A set function, g : P(V )→ R, is submodular if and only if for any
α1 ⊆ V, α2 ⊆ α1, i ∈ V \ α1:
g(α1 ∪ {i})− g(α1) ≤ g(α2 ∪ {i})− g(α2).
For a submodular function, the incremental gain of adding an element to the set α1 is less
than or equal to the gain of adding the element to a smaller subset of α1. A supermodular
function has the inequality in the opposite direction.
B. Most-Probable Configuration: A Submodular Problem
The Most-Probable Configuration Problem (5) seeks the maximum of a pseudo-Boolean
function that maps a 0-1 vector, the network configuration x, to a scalar. The network
configuration x ∈ {0, 1}N is the characteristic vector or characteristic function of the set
of infected agents: αx = {i | i ∈ V, xi = 1}. Let h(αx) be the set of infected edges (i.e.,
edges where both end nodes are infected) in configuration x: h(αx) = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ V, xi =
1, xj = 1}.
The number of infected agents in configuration x is |αx| = 1
Tx. The number of infected
edges is |h(αx)| =
xTAx
2
. The Most-Probable Configuration Problem is then to solve for the
maximum argument of
g(αx) =
(
λ
µ
)|αx|
γ|h(αx)|. (6)
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We will prove in Theorem IV.2 that − log(g(αx)) is a submodular function. Therefore,
we can solve for its minimum argument in polynomial time. Lemma IV.1 sets up some basic
conditions that makes proving Theorem IV.2 easier.
Lemma IV.1. Consider two sets of infected agents, α1, α2 ⊆ V and i ∈ V \ α1. The
cardinalities of α1 and α2 are |α1| = n1 and |α2| = n2, respectively; then |α1 ∪ {i}| = n1+1,
and |α2 ∪ {i}| = n2+1. The numbers of infected edges induced by α1 and α2 are |h(α1)| = e1
and |h(α2)| = e2, respectively. Let |h(α1 ∪ {i})| = e1 + m1 and |h(α2 ∪ {i})| = e2 + m2;
therefore m1 is the number of additional infected edges created with the inclusion of agent i
in α1 and m2 is the number of additional infected edges created with the inclusion of agent
i in α2. Let α2 ⊆ α1. Then:
1. n1 ≥ n2.
2. e1 ≥ e2.
3. m1 ≥ m2.
Proof. 1. When α2 ⊂ α1, α2 must have strictly fewer number of infected agents than
α1. When α2 = α1, then they contain the same number of infected agents. Hence,
n1 ≥ n2.
2. When α2 ⊂ α1, infected agents in α2 can not induce more infected edges than the
number of infected edges induced by the infected agents in α1. When α2 = α1, then
the infected agents in α1 and α2 will induce the same number of infected edges. Hence,
e1 ≥ e2.
3. Every infected agent in α2 is an infected agent in α1. Every new infected edge connect-
ing the infected agent j ∈ α2 with i is also a new infected edge in α1 ∪ {i}. However,
some edge may also have j ∈ α1. Hence, m1 ≥ m2.
Theorem IV.2. Let g(αx) be the set function given in (6). If λ > 0, µ > 0 and γ ≥ 1, then
− log(g(αx)) is a submodular function, where
− log(g(αx)) = − |αx| log
(
λ
µ
)
− |h(αx)| log(γ).
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Proof. To prove submodularity of − log(g(αx)), we need to show that
− log(g(α1 ∪ {i})) + log(g(α1)) ≤ − log(g(α2 ∪ {i})) + log(g(α2)), (7)
for any α1 ⊆ V, α2 ⊆ α1, i ∈ V \ α1.
The left-hand side (LHS) of (7) is
−(n1 + 1) log
(
λ
µ
)
− (e1 +m1) log(γ) + n1 log
(
λ
µ
)
+ e1 log(γ), (8)
which reduces to
− log
(
λ
µ
)
−m1 log(γ). (9)
The right-hand side (RHS) of (7) is
−(n2 + 1) log
(
λ
µ
)
− (e2 +m2) log(γ) + n2 log
(
λ
µ
)
+ e2 log(γ), (10)
which reduces to
− log
(
λ
µ
)
−m2 log(γ). (11)
Expression (7) reduces to
− log
(
λ
µ
)
−m1 log(γ) ≤ − log
(
λ
µ
)
−m2 log(γ).
Since γ ≥ 1, we know that log(γ) ≥ 0 and that m1 ≥ m2 by Lemma IV.1. Therefore, the
LHS of (7) is less than or equal to the RHS of (7) for any α1 ⊆ V, α2 ⊆ α1, i ∈ V \ α1. By
definition, − log(g(αx)) is a submodular function.
Theorem IV.2 proves that − log(g(αx)) is submodular if λ > 0, µ > 0, and γ ≥ 1;
this means that log(g(αx)) is supermodular under the same condition. Since the logarithm
function is a monotonic function, the maximum argument of log(g(αx)) is also the maximum
argument of g(αx), which is the solution to the Most-Probable Configuration Problem.
As Regime II) Endogenous Infection Dominant: 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1 satisfies the
condition that γ ≥ 1, using submodular optimization, we can find the exact most-probable
configuration of the scaled SIS process in Regime II) for arbitrary network topology in
polynomial time.
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C. Social Networks and the Power Grid
The most-probable configuration allows us to identify the set of agents that are vulnerable
to network epidemics since it retains the state of all the agents. Agents who are infected
in the most-probable configuration are more vulnerable to the epidemics than agents who
remain healthy. Because the most-probable configuration is derived from a dynamical model
of network diffusion processes, the set of vulnerable agents depends on the infection and
healing rates, λ, γ, µ.
As we showed in [5], the most-probable configuration changes depending on these param-
eters. When the healing rate is high, x∗ = x0, meaning that the epidemics is not severe.
When the infection rate is high, x∗ = xN , the epidemics is severe, and all the agents are
vulnerable. When x∗ is a non-degenerate configuration (i.e, x∗ 6= x0,xN), this indicates that
sets of agents in the network are more vulnerable than others to the epidemics. We illustrate
this by solving for the most-probable configuration using [20] under different
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
param-
eters for 2 realistic networks: a social network [8] and the Western United States power grid
[9], obtained from [21]
The network shown in Fig. 1 is a 193 node, 273 edge social network of drug users in
Hartford, CT. The network was determined through interviews. Reference [22] looked for
influential agents in the network by considering it as a graph connectivity problem. However,
they did not consider a dynamical model of influence. Assuming that we can model drug
habits as an epidemics (i.e., there is a social contagion aspect to the behavior), we applied
the scaled SIS process to this network and solved for the most-probable configuration under
different parameters to find influential network structures.
We show the resultant most-probable configurations in Fig. 1a, Fig. 1b, Fig. 1c, Fig. 1d
as we change
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
. We can see from these results that there is a small community of
users who are infected when others are healthy. The size of this community increases or
decreases depending on the parameters. If there is a social contagion component to drug
usage, then these agents may be more vulnerable to the social contagion component of drug
usage and therefore more likely to persist in their habit. In the next section, we will relate
the most-probable configuration to the network substructure.
The network shown in Fig. 2 is the 4941 node, 6595 edge power grid network of the
Western United States used by Watts and Strogatz. They showed through simulation of the
12
SIR (susceptible-infected-removed) epidemics model on the western power grid that small-
world networks like the western power grid are more conducive to spreading infection/failures
than lattice networks. This is useful for explaining why failures propagate so quickly in a
blackout. However, they did not identify which components in the power grid are more
vulnerable to the epidemics.
Figure 2a and Fig. 2b show the most-probable configuration for the western US power grid
when for the scaled SIS process parameterized
(
λ
µ
= 0.33, γ = 2
)
and
(
λ
µ
= 0.33, γ = 2.6
)
,
respectively. We can see that for the same λ
µ
, as γ increases, thereby increasing the infec-
tiousness of epidemics, the number of infected agents increases. This is intuitive since, for
large γ, the epidemics is severe, and the most-probable configuration is driven toward xN , the
configuration where all the agents are infected. Moreover, the most-probable configurations
are both non-degenerate configurations. The agents who are infected at equilibrium are more
vulnerable to the network epidemics than agents who are healthy. By using submodular op-
timization, we can identify these more vulnerable agents, by solving for the most-probable
configuration out of 24941 total possible configurations, exactly and in polynomial time.
An important question is to relate the most-probable configuration to network structure.
We will show in the next section that the most-probable configuration is related to subgraph
density by rewriting the equilibrium distribution (3) in terms of induced subgraphs instead
of network configurations.
V. MOST-PROBABLE CONFIGURATION AND NETWORK STRUCTURE
In the previous section, we showed that we can exactly solve for the most-probable con-
figuration with a polynomial time algorithm. The exact solution, however, does not give
insight on how the most-probable configuration changes depending on the parameters
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
and on the network topology. In this section, we draw the connection between the most-
probable configuration and subgraphs in the network. As per our intuition for epidemics,
densely connected network structures are more vulnerable to network epidemics; the scaled
SIS process quantifies this intuition. First, we will define the graph theoretic terms used in
this section.
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(b) λ
µ
= 0.267, γ = 3
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= 0.4, γ = 1.2
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(d) λ
µ
= 0.5, γ = 1.6
FIG. 1: (Color online) Most-Probable Configuration x∗ under Different
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
Parameters
(Blue/Grey = Infected, White = Healthy).
A. Induced Subgraphs and Graph Density
Definition V.1 (From [10]). The graph H is an induced subgraph of G if two vertices in
H are connected if and only if they are connected in G and the vertex set and edge set of H
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(a) λ
µ
= 0.33, γ = 2
(b) λ
µ
= 0.33, γ = 2.6
FIG. 2: (Color online) Most-Probable Configuration x∗ under Different
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
Parameters
(Blue/Black = Infected, Red = Healthy).
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are subsets of the vertex set and edge set of G.
V (H) ⊆ V (G), E(H) ⊆ V (G)
Definition V.2. The graphH(x) is an induced subgraph of configuration x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
T
if the nodes/edges in the subgraph are the infected agents/edges in x.
V (H(x)) = {vi ∈ V (G) | xi = 1} (12)
E(H(x)) = {(i, j) ∈ E(G) | xi = 1, xj = 1} (13)
By definition, |V (H(x))| = 1Tx and |E(H(x))| = x
TAx
2
. Figure 3 and Fig. 4 show two
network configurations and their corresponding induced subgraphs. We proved in [23] that
configurations whose induced subgraphs are isomorphic are equally probable. Unless we
need to refer explicitly to the underlying network configuration x, for notational simplicity,
we will write H to denote an induced subgraph instead of writing H(x).
V2
V1
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V2
V3
V4
(a) (b)
FIG. 3: (a) Configuration x1 = [0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
T , (b) Induced Subgraph H(x1) = H1
.
V2
V1
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V5
V6
V7
(a) (b)
FIG. 4: (a) Configuration x2 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1]
T , (b) Induced Subgraph H(x2) = H2
.
Definition V.3. The set of all possible induced subgraphs of G is H = {H(x)}, ∀x ∈ X .
The set H includes the empty graph, which is induced by the configuration x0 =
[0, 0, . . . , 0]T , and G, which is the subgraph induced by the configuration xN = [1, 1, . . . , 1]T .
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Definition V.4 (From [24]). The density of the graph G is
d(G) =
|E(G)|
|V (G)|
.
There is an alternative definition for graph density that is the number of edges divided
by the total number of possible edges [25]. Unfortunately, these two definitions of density
are not equivalent.
We will refer to the density of the entire network, d(G) = d(H(xN)), as the network
density, and the density of an induced subgraph of G as the subgraph density. The density
of the empty graph, d(H(x0)), is 0 by definition. The subgraphs in H can be partially
ordered by their density. There may be many subgraphs with the same density. A special
induced subgraph in H is the densest subgraph.
Definition V.5. Let H be the densest subgraph in G. Then
d(H) ≥ d(H), ∀H ∈ H.
Finding H is known as the Densest Subgraph Problem. It is known that this problem
can be solved in polynomial time exactly and in linear time in approximation for undirected
graphs [24].
B. Equilibrium Distribution of the Scaled SIS Process
Since there is a one-to-one relationship between the network configuration x and its
induced subgraph H(x), we can rewrite the equilibrium distribution (3) of the scaled SIS
process in terms of the induced subgraph density and the size of the induced subgraph:
pi(H) =
1
Z
((
λ
µ
)
γd(H)
)|V (H)|
, H ∈ H, (14)
where d(H) is the density of the subgraph and Z is the partition function.
The Most-Probable Configuration Problem (5) is then also an optimization problem over
all the possible induced subgraphs in G:
H(x∗) = argmax
H∈H
((
λ
µ
)
γd(H)
)|V (H)|
. (15)
The subgraph induced by the most-probable configuration, H(x∗), is the most-probable sub-
graph, but this is not necessarily the same subgraph as the densest subgraph, H.
17
Stating the equilibrium distribution in terms of the induced subgraph will allow us to
derive several theorems regarding the most-probable configuration. For the theorems that
follow, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.: The scaled SIS process operates in Regime II) Endogenous Infection
Dominant. This limits the effective infection and the endogenous infection to the
range, 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1 and γ > 1.
Assumption 2.: The underlying network G is a simple, undirected, unweighted, and con-
nected graph.
C. Most-Probable Configuration and Subgraphs
Theorem V.6. [Proof in Appendix A] The most-probable configuration x∗ 6= x0 if and only
if there exists at least one induced subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) for which λγd(H) > µ.
Theorem V.7. [Proof in Appendix B]
Case 1: The densest subgraph, H, is the network G. Then, x∗ 6= xN if and only if
λ
µ
γd(G) ≤ 1.
Case 2: The densest subgraph, H, is not the network G. Then, x∗ 6= xN if and only if
there exists at least one induced subgraph H ∈ H \G with density d(H) = E
′
N ′
for which
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
. (16)
Corollary V.8. [Proof in Appendix C] Let the density of the network be d(G) = E
N
. Then,
the most-probable configuration is a non-degenerate configuration, x∗ ∈ X \ {x0,xN}, if and
only if there exists at least one induced subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) = E
′
N ′
for which
λγd(H) > µ, and
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
.
In Regime II) individual agents have a preference for being healthy, but the epidemics
might spread to other agents through neighbor-to-neighbor contagion. Under the scaled SIS
process, the subgraph density d(H) scales the exogenous infection rate γ, thereby affecting
the overall infection rate. Theorem V.6 states that, if the network contains dense-enough
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subgraphs, then even when the effective exogenous infection rate, λ
µ
, is small (i.e., 0 < λ
µ
≪
1), the exogenous infection rate, γ, can leverage dense subgraphs to spread the infection
throughout the network.
On the other hand, if the endogenous infection rate, γ, is large (i.e., γ ≫ 1), then most
certainly the epidemics will spread throughout the entire network. Theorem V.7 states
when this does not happen. Furthermore, Theorem V.7 shows that it is important to
consider if the densest subgraph in the network is the entire network or a smaller subgraph.
Corollary V.8 proves that the existence of the non-degenerate configurations is related to
the existence of subgraphs with density larger than the network density. The existence of
these denser-than G subgraphs is crucial to the existence of non-degenerate configurations
(i.e., different from x0 and xN ) as solutions to the Most-Probable Configuration Problem;
when the most-probable configuration is a non-degenerate configuration, agents belonging
to denser subgraphs are more vulnerable to the epidemics.
In network science, dense clusters of agents have often been identified as either the network
core or community [2, 26, 27]. Solving for the non-degenerate configuration is an alternative
method for determining these network structures. Previous works in core/community detec-
tion are algorithmic and do not consider the dynamical process on the network. The scaled
SIS process, however, is a model for dynamical processes on networks and, therefore, what
is considered a community changes depending on the parameters of the dynamical process:
the most-probable configuration changes depending on the exogenous rates λ
µ
and on the
endogenous rates γ.
To get an easy visual interpretation of Theorem V.6 and V.7, we illustrate them with
two small 16-node examples; Network A shown in Fig. 5 and Network B in Fig. 6. For
each network, we fix the effective exogenous infection rate, λ
µ
= 0.5. We then solve for
the most-probable configuration for different γ, ranging from 1.2 to 3. As the endogenous
infection rate, γ, changes, the most-probable configuration also changes. In Fig. 5a and
Fig. 6a, neither network supports dense enough subgraphs for the epidemics to spread. But
as γ increases, the infection starts to spread. In Network A, there is at least one subgraph
denser than the network. The subgraph induced by V 1, V 2, V 3, V 4, V 5, V 7, V 8, V 9, V 10
has a density of 1.33 whereas the density of the entire network is 1.19. In Fig. 5b, the most-
probable configuration has these 9 agents infected while the other 7 agents remain healthy.
The 9 agents in the dense subgraph are more vulnerable to the epidemics when λ
µ
= 0.5 and
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= 0.5, γ = 2
d(H(x∗)) = 1.19
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(d) λ
µ
= 0.5, γ = 3
d(H(x∗)) = 1.19
FIG. 5: (Color online) Most-Probable Configuration x∗ under Different
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
Parameters
(Blue/Grey = Infected, White = Healthy).
γ = 1.7.
In Network B, there are at least two subgraphs denser than the network and they are
induced by the set of infected agents of the most-probable configuration as shown in Fig. 6b
and Fig. 6c. We can see by solving for the most-probable configuration for different parame-
ter values that, as the endogenous infection increases, the most-probable configuration goes
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(d) λ
µ
= 0.5, γ = 1.7
d(H(x∗)) = 2.4375
FIG. 6: (Color online) Most-Probable Configuration x∗ under Different
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
Parameters
(Blue/Grey = Infected, White = Healthy).
toward xN as all agents become vulnerable to the epidemics.
It is easier for the infection to spread in Network B than in Network A, since, at the same
effective exogenous infection rate, x∗ = xN for Network B when γ = 1.7 but x∗ 6= xN for
Network A with the same exogenous infection rate. This is because Network B is a denser
graph (d(G) = 2.4375) than Graph A (d(G) = 1.19).
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D. Most-Probable Configuration and the Densest Subgraph
We showed that the most-probable configuration is related to the density of induced
subgraphs in the network. The densest subgraph, H , is a special induced subgraph. In this
section, we focus specifically on the relationship between the most-probable configuration
and the densest subgraph.
Corollary V.9. [Proof in Appendix D] The most-probable configuration x∗ = x0 if and only
if λγd(H) ≤ µ.
Corollary V.9 follows the result of Theorem V.6. If the densest subgraph in the network is
not dense enough to overcome individual preferences for being healthy, then the endogenous
infection rate γ will not be able to drive the most-probable configuration away from x0.
Lastly, because of the connection between the most-probable configuration of the scaled
SIS process and the densest subgraph, we can prove a general statement regarding network
structure using results from dynamical processes on networks.
Corollary V.10. [Proof in Appendix E] If G is a k-regular, complete multipartite, or com-
plete multipartite with k-regular islands network, then H = G. That is, for these structured
networks, the densest subgraph is the overall graph.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced in previous works the scaled SIS process, which is a mathematically an-
alyzable model for modeling diffusion processes on a static network [5]. The scaled SIS
process is a reversible Markov process and has a closed-form equilibrium distribution that
explicitly accounts for the underlying network topology via the adjacency matrix. It is
parameterized by 2 parameters:
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
. The effective exogenous infection rate λ
µ
controls
the exogenous, or the topology-independent behavior of the scaled SIS process whereas the
exogenous infection rate γ controls the endogenous or the topology-dependent behavior of
the process.
Depending on if the parameter values are between 0 and 1 or great than 1, the scaled
SIS process models qualitatively different network diffusion processes. In Regime II) En-
dogenous Infection Dominant: 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1, the scaled SIS process best models
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a network epidemics process; individuals prefer to be healthy, while neighbor-to-neighbor
infection helps to spread the epidemics throughout the population.
This paper analyzes the Most-Probable Configuration Problem that solves for the network
state with the maximum equilibrium probability, in Regime II) for arbitrary networks. First,
we prove that the Most-Probable Configuration Problem in Regime II) is submodular. This
means that we can compute the exact most-probable configuration in polynomial time. We
use the most-probable configuration of the scaled SIS process to identify sets of vulnerable
agents/components for a social network of drug users and the Western US power grid under
different infection/healing rates.
We then showed that the most-probable configuration is dependent on certain classes of
subgraphs in the networks. If there exist dense-enough subgraphs, conditioned on the right
set of parameters, the most-probable configuration will shift away from x0, the network
state where all the agents are healthy. However, if there exist subgraphs that are denser-
than the entire network, conditioned on the right range of infection and healing rates, the
most-probable configuration may not reach xN , the network state with all agents infected.
We call the solution of the Most-Probable Configuration Problem that is neither x0 nor xN ,
the non-degenerate configuration. Non-degenerate configurations identify subsets of agents
that are more vulnerable to the network epidemics than others.
We also proved in this paper using results in [5] that structured networks such as k-
regular, complete multipartite, complete multipartite with k-regular islands do not contain
subgraphs that are denser than the overall network. Therefore, if we want to avoid subsets of
agents being more vulnerable than others, we should use these types of structured networks.
Our analysis of the scaled SIS process in Regime II) informs us that network subgraph
structures are important for understanding network diffusion processes. For future work,
we are interested in statistically characterizing the subgraphs in network classes such as
small-world networks and scaled-free networks.
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Appendix A: Proof for Theorem V.6
Theorem. The most-probable configuration x∗ 6= x0 if and only if there exists at least one
induced subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) for which λγd(H) > µ.
Proof. Sufficiency: If there exists at least one subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) for
which λγd(H) > µ, then x∗ 6= x0.
Using the equilibrium distribution (3), pi(x0) = 1
Z
. Let the subgraph H ∈ H be the sub-
graph induced by configuration x′ ∈ X \x0. The number of infected agents in configuration
x′ is 1Tx′ =| V (H) |> 0. Using (14), its equilibrium probability is
pi(x′) = pi(H) =
1
Z
((
λ
µ
)
γd(H)
)|V (H)|
If
(
λ
µ
)
γd(H) > 1, we know that pi(x′) > pi(x0). Therefore, x0 can not be the most-probable
configuration.
Necessity: If x∗ 6= x0, then there exist at least one subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H)
for which λγd(H) > µ.
If x∗ 6= x0, this means that there is some configuration x′ for which pi(x′) > pi(x0).
We know that pi(x0) = 1
Z
. Using the equilibrium distribution in (14) and the fact that
1Tx = |V (H)| > 0, ∀x ∈ X \ x0, we can conclude that there must exist some induced
subgraph whose density satisfies this condition
(
λ
µ
)
γd(H(x
′) > 1.
Appendix B: Proof for Theorem V.7
Theorem. Case 1: The densest subgraph, H, is the network G. Then, x∗ 6= xN if and only
if λ
µ
γd(G) ≤ 1.
Case 2: The densest subgraph, H, is not the network G. Then, x∗ 6= xN if and only if
there exists at least one induced subgraph H ∈ H \G with density d(H) = E
′
N ′
for which
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
. (B1)
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Proof. Sufficiency: Lets first prove sufficiency for both case 1 and case 2.
Case 1: H = G. If λγd(G) ≤ µ, then x∗ 6= xN .
Follows from Corollary V.9: If λγd(H(x)) ≤ µ, then x∗ = x0.
Case 2: H 6= G. If there exists at least one induced subgraph H ∈ H with density
d(H) = E
′
N ′
such that
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
< N
′
N
, then x∗ 6= xN .
The subgraph H is induced by the configuration x′ ∈ X . The log equilibrium probability
according to (14) for x′ and xN , respectively, are:
log(pi(x′)) = log
(
1
Z
)
+N ′ log
(
λ
µ
γd(H)
)
and
log(pi(xN )) = log
(
1
Z
)
+N log
(
λ
µ
γd(G)
)
.
Condition
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
< N
′
N
implies that N log
(
λ
µ
γd(G)
)
< N ′ log
(
λ
µ
γd(H)
)
. Therefore,
log(pi(x′)) > log(pi(xN)). Since the logarithm is a monotonic function, we can conclude that
x∗ 6= xN .
Necessity: We now prove necessity for both case 1 and case 2.
Case 1: H = G. If x∗ 6= xN , then λγd(G) ≤ µ.
Follows from Corollary V.9: If x∗ = x0, then λγd(H(x)) ≤ µ.
Case 2: H 6= G. If x∗ 6= xN , then there exists at least one induced subgraph H ∈ H such
that
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
< N
′
N
.
Let x∗ = x′, which induces a subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H). Using (14),
pi(x′) = log
(
1
Z
)
+N ′ log
(
λ
µ
γd(H)
)
pi(xN ) = log
(
1
Z
)
+N log
(
λ
µ
γd(G)
)
.
This means pi(x′)− pi(xN ) > 0, which implies
N ′ log
(
λ
µ
γd(H)
)
−N log
(
λ
µ
γd(G)
)
> 0
This reduces to the condition that
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
.
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Appendix C: Proof for Corollary V.8
Corollary. Let the density of the network be d(G) = E
N
. Then, the most-probable configura-
tion is a non-degenerate configuration, x∗ ∈ X \ {x0,xN}, if and only if there exists at least
one induced subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) = E
′
N ′
for which λγd(H) > µ, and
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
.
Proof. Theorem V.6 gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the most-probable con-
figuration x∗ 6= x0 to be existence of a subgraph H such that λγd(H) > µ. Theorem V.7
gives the necessary and sufficient condition that the most-probable configuration is not xN
when
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
.
This proves the Corollary.
Appendix D: Proof for Corollary V.9
Corollary. The most-probable configuration x∗ = x0 if and only if λγd(H) ≤ µ.
Proof. Sufficiency: If λγd(H) ≤ µ, then x∗ = x0.
Recall the definition of the densest subgraph V.5. With γ > 1, λγd(H(x)) ≤ λγd(H(x)) ≤ µ
for all possible induced subgraphs in G. This means that there is no subgraph, H ∈ H, for
which λγd(H) > µ. We can conclude that x∗ = x0 using the contrapositive of Theorem V.6:
If there is no subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) for which λγd(H) > µ, then x∗ = x0.
Necessity: If x∗ = x0, then λγd(H) ≤ µ.
The result follows from the contrapositive of Theorem V.6: If x∗ = x0, then there is no
subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) for which λγd(H) > µ. Therefore, all induced subgraphs,
including the densest subgraph have density for which λγd(H) ≤ µ.
Appendix E: Proof for Corollary V.10
Corollary. If G is a k-regular, complete multipartite, or complete multipartite with k-regular
islands network, then H = G. That is, for these structured networks, the densest subgraph
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is the overall graph.
Proof. We proved previously in [5] that the solution of the Most-Probable Configuration
Problem for any parameters
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
in Regime II) Endogenous Infection Dominant:
0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1, over k-regular, complete multipartite, complete multipartite with k-regular
islands networks is either x0 and/or xN; the solution to the Most-Probable Configuration
Problem for these networks is not a non-degenerate configuration in Regime II). We will use
this and Corollary V.8 to prove this corollary.
Consider the contrapositive of Corollary V.8: Let the density of the network be d(G) = E
N
.
Then, the most-probable configuration is not a non-degenerate configuration, x∗ ∈ {x0,xN},
if and only if there does not exist any subgraph H ∈ H with density d(H) = E
′
N ′
for which
λγd(H) > µ, or
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
<
N ′
N
.
This implies that all the induced subgraphs, H ∈ H, in networks whose solution to the
Most-Probable Configuration Problem is not a non-degenerate configuration in Regime II),
satisfy the condition that λγd(H) ≤ µ or
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
≥
N ′
N
,
for all 0 < λ
µ
≤ 1, γ > 1.
Depending on the effective infection rate and the endogenous infection rate,
(
λ
µ
, γ
)
, the
first condition λγd(H) ≤ µ may not be satisfied. However, since N
′
N
≤ 1 regardless of the
parameters and the underlying network, the second condition is satisfied if
log(λ
µ
γd(G))
log(λ
µ
γd(H))
≥ 1, ∀H ∈ H.
Since γ > 1, this means that d(H) ≤ d(G) for all possible induced subgraph. As this only
depend on the structure of the underlying network, we can conclude that d(H) ≤ d(G) for
networks whose most-probable configuration can only be x0 and/or xN .
[1] M. Newman, Networks: an Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010).
27
[2] P. Csermely, A. London, L.-Y. Wu, and B. Uzzi, Journal of Complex Networks 1, 93 (2013).
[3] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, Physical Review E 65, 035108 (2002).
[4] D. R. De Souza and T. Tome´, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389, 1142
(2010).
[5] J. Zhang and J. M. F. Moura, IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing 8, 537 (2014).
[6] J. Zhang and J. M. F. Moura, in Proceedings of International Conference on Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing (ICASSP) (IEEE, 2013) pp. 5411–5414.
[7] Y. Wang, D. Chakrabarti, C. Wang, and C. Faloutsos, in Proceedings of the International
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (Florence, Italy, 2003) pp. 25–34.
[8] M. R. Weeks, S. Clair, S. P. Borgatti, K. Radda, and J. J. Schensul, AIDS and Behavior 6,
193 (2002).
[9] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, Nature 393, 440 (1998).
[10] G. R. C. Godsil, Algebraic Graph Theory (Springer-Verlag, 2001).
[11] M. Draief, A. Ganesh, and L. Massoulie´, in Proceedings of the International Conference on
Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools (ACM, 2006) p. 51.
[12] A. Ganesh, L. Massoulie, and D. Towsley, in Proceedings of the Annual Joint Conference of
the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (Miami, USA, 2005) pp. 1455–1466 vol.
2.
[13] J. R. Norris, Markov Chains, 2008 (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
[14] F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[15] S. Bonaccorsi, S. Ottaviano, F. De Pellegrini, A. Socievole, and P. Van Mieghem,
Physics Review E 90, 012810 (2014).
[16] A. Billionnet and M. Minoux, Discrete Applied Mathematics 12, 1 (1985).
[17] E. Boros and P. L. Hammer, Discrete Applied Mathematics 123, 155 (2002).
[18] M. Gro¨tschel, L. Lova´sz, and A. Schrijver, Combinatorica 1, 169 (1981).
[19] L. Lova´sz, in Mathematical Programming The State of the Art (Springer, 1983) pp. 235–257.
[20] A. Krause, The Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 1141 (2010).
[21] J. Leskovec and A. Krevl, “SNAP Datasets: Stanford large network dataset collection,”
http://snap.stanford.edu/data (2014).
[22] S. P. Borgatti, in Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and
Papers (National Academies Press, 2003) p. 241.
28
[23] J. Zhang and J. M. F. Moura, in Proceedings of International Conference on Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing (ICASSP) (IEEE, 2014) pp. 1125–1129.
[24] S. Khuller and B. Saha, in Automata, Languages and Programming (Springer, 2009) pp. 597–
608.
[25] S. Wasserman, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Vol. 8 (Cambridge uni-
versity press, 1994).
[26] S. P. Borgatti and M. G. Everett, Social Networks 21, 375 (2000).
[27] U. Brandes, J. Pfeffer, and I. Mergel, Studying Social Networks: A Guide to Empirical
Research (Campus, 2013).
29
